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| 20120113 [2012/01/11 14:59] – sari | 20120113 [2012/01/13 13:48] (current) – tanvir |
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| | **Department news**: \\ |
| | From 2012, seminar room is changing to a bigger one 0.2.11 |
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| | **Presentation (discussion)** \\ |
| | This Friday Sari will give a presentation. |
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| | **Title**\\ |
| | Refining a Quantitative Information Flow Metric |
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| **Abstract**\\ | **Abstract**\\ |
| We introduce a new perspective into the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers, by a range consistent with the size of a program's secret input instead of by a mathematically sound (but counter-intuitive) upper bound of that leakage. To substantiate our position, we present a refinement of a recent QIF metric that appears in the literature. Our refinement is based on slight changes we bring into the design of that metric. These changes do not affect the theoretical premises onto which the original metric is laid. However, they enable the natural association between flow results and the exhaustive search effort needed to uncover program's secret information (or the residual secret part of that information) to be clearly established. The refinement we discuss in this paper validates our perspective and demonstrates its importance in the future design of QIF quantifiers. | We introduce a new perspective into the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers, by a range consistent with the size of a program's secret input instead of by a mathematically sound (but counter-intuitive) upper bound of that leakage. To substantiate our position, we present a refinement of a recent QIF metric that appears in the literature. Our refinement is based on slight changes we bring into the design of that metric. These changes do not affect the theoretical premises onto which the original metric is laid. However, they enable the natural association between flow results and the exhaustive search effort needed to uncover program's secret information (or the residual secret part of that information) to be clearly established. The refinement we discuss in this paper validates our perspective and demonstrates its importance in the future design of QIF quantifiers. |
| **Keywords**\\ | **Keywords**\\ |
| computer security, quantitative information flow, leakage, information theory, measurement, program analysis, non-interference, confidentiality | computer security, quantitative information flow, leakage, information theory, measurement, program analysis, non-interference, confidentiality |
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| | **Attendance:**\\ |
| | * Sari Haj Hussein |
| | * Christian Thomsen |
| | * Chaithanya |
| | * Darius Sidlauskas |
| | * Mohamed Khalefa |
| | * Laurynas Siksnys |
| | * Saulius |
| | * Tanvir Ahmed |
| | * Torben Bach Pedersen |
| | * Kristian Torp |
| | * Liu Xiufeng |
| | * Yoann Pitarch |
| | * Asif Iqbal Baba |
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